

CURRICULUM VITAE

David A. Malueg

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EDUCATION

Northwestern University
Northwestern University
University of Wisconsin

Major

Economics
Economics
Economics

Degree

Ph.D.
M.A.
B.A. (Honors and Phi Beta Kappa)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Economic Inquiry, Co-Editor, 7/2014–
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Associate Editor, 3/2014–
Journal of Industrial Economics, Associate Editor, 10/2007–7/2013

University of California, Riverside, California

7/2007–current Professor of Economics
7/2007–7/2010 and 7/2015 – Chair, Undergraduate Affairs Committee

University Montesquieu–Bordeaux IV, Bordeaux, France

5/2014 Visiting Professor of Economics
5/2013–6/2013 Visiting Professor of Economics

Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana

7/1999–7/2007 Professor of Economics
7/1999–6/2002 Chair, Department of Economics
7/2003–7/2004 and 7/1998–7/1999 Director of Graduate Studies
7/1991–7/1999 Associate Professor of Economics
7/1991–12/2005 Adjunct, A.B. Freeman School of Business

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Washington, D.C.

3/1990–6/1991 Director of Research, Economic Analysis Group
6/1986–7/1991 Economist, Economic Analysis Group

University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa

8/1983–6/1986

Assistant Professor

8/1982–8/1983

Instructor

Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

1/1982–4/1982

Instructor

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomics, game theory, industrial organization, public economics, and environmental economics

UNIVERSITY SERVICE AT UCR

University Senate Committees: member of the Committee on Academic Personnel (Promotion and Tenure), the Committee on Privilege and Tenure, the Committee on Courses, and the Grievance Consultation Panel

College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences: member of the Executive Committee

Economics Department: member of the Planning and Advisory Committee; regular member or chair of the microeconomics qualifying exam committee and field exam committee; chair of two microeconomics search committees

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

University of California, Riverside

Intermediate Microeconomics, Industrial Organization (undergrad), Microeconomic Theory (ph.d.), Special Topics in Microeconomics (ph.d., separate courses in industrial organization, auction theory, and contest theory), Game Theory (ph.d. and undergraduate), Economic Theory Colloquia (organizer)

Tulane University

Advanced Microeconomics (ph.d.), Industrial Organization (ph.d and undergraduate), Game Theory (ph.d. and undergraduate), Topics in Advanced Microeconomics, Intermediate Microeconomics, Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus, Economic Statistics, Principles of Microeconomics

The University of Iowa

Seminar in Economic Theory (Statistical Decision Theory, ph.d.), Mathematical Economics III (Information Economics, ph.d.), Microeconomics II (ph.d.), Mathematics for Economists (ph.d.), Statistical Methods in Econometrics, Intermediate Microeconomics

Northwestern University

Survey of Statistical Methods for Economic Analysis

PUBLICATIONS

“Private-Information Group Contests: Best-Shot Competition,” with Stefano Barbieri, *Games and Economic Behavior* **98** (2016), 219–234.

“Private Information in the BBV Model of Public Goods,” with Stefano Barbieri, *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, forthcoming.

“The Best-Shot All-Pay (Group) Auction with Complete Information,” with Stefano Barbieri and Iryna Topolyan, *Economic Theory* **57** (2014), 603–640.

“Group Efforts when Performance Is Determined by the ‘Best Shot,’” with Stefano Barbieri, *Economic Theory* **56** (2014), 333–373.

“Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice,” with Stefano Barbieri, *Journal of Public Economic Theory* **16** (2014), 372–400.

“Equilibrium and Revenue in a Family of Common-Value First-Price Auctions with Differential Information,” with Ram Orzach, *International Journal of Game Theory* **41** (2012), 219–254.

“Threshold Uncertainty in the Private-Information Subscription Game,” with Stefano Barbieri, *Journal of Public Economics* **94** (2010), 848–861.

“Testing Contest Theory: Evidence from Best-of-Three Tennis Matches,” with Andrew Yates, *Review of Economics and Statistics* **92** (2010), 689–692.

“Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments,” with Stefano Barbieri, *B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics* **10** (2010) (Contributions), Issue 1, Article 5 (29 pages), available at <http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art5>.

“Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in the Nash Demand Game,” *Economic Theory* **44** (2010), 243–270.

“Revenue Comparison in Common-Value Auctions: two examples,” with Ram Orzach, *Economics Letters* **105** (2009), 177–180.

“Bilateral Oligopoly, Private Information, and Pollution Permit Markets,” with Andrew Yates, *Environmental and Resource Economics* **43** (2009), 553–572.

“Strategic Behavior, Private Information, and Decentralization in the European Union Emissions Trading System,” with Andrew Yates, *Environmental and Resource Economics* **43** (2009), 413–432.

“Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous-Strategy Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game,” with Stefano Barbieri, *Journal of Public Economic Theory* **10** (2008), 529–545.

“Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Efficient Equilibria in the Private-Information Contribution Game,” with Stefano Barbieri, *Economic Theory* **37** (2008), 51–80.

- “Compatibility Incentives of a Large Network Facing Multiple Rivals,” with Marius Schwartz, *Journal of Industrial Economics* **54** (2006), 527–567.
- “Bounding the Relative Profitability of Price Discrimination,” with Christopher Snyder, the *International Journal of Industrial Organization* **24** (2006), 995–1011.
- “Citizen Participation in Pollution Permit Markets,” with Andrew Yates, the *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* **51** (2006), 205–217.
- “Equilibria in Rent-Seeking Contests with Homogeneous Success Functions,” with Andrew Yates, *Economic Theory* **27** (2006), 719–727.
- “Equilibria and Comparative Statics in Two-Player Contests,” with Andrew Yates, the *European Journal of Political Economy* **21** (2005), 738–752.
- “Rent Seeking with Private Values,” with Andrew Yates, *Public Choice* **119** (2004), 161–178; to be reprinted in *Forty Years of Rent-Seeking Research*, Roger Congleton, Arye Hillman, and Kai A. Konrad eds., Springer-Verlag GmbH.
- “International Telecom Settlements: Gaming Incentives, Carrier Alliances and Pareto-Superior Reform,” with Marius Schwartz, *Journal of Industrial Economics* **49** (2001), 335–377.
- “Distributional Assumptions in the Theory of Oligopoly Information Exchange,” with Shunichi O. Tsutsui, *International Journal of Industrial Organization* **16** (1998), 785–797.
- “Oligopoly Information Exchange when Nonnegative Price and Output Constraints May Bind,” with Shunichi O. Tsutsui, *Australian Economic Papers* **37** (1998), 363–371.
- “Dynamic R&D Competition with Learning,” with Shunichi O. Tsutsui, *Rand Journal of Economics* **28** (1997), 751–772.
- “Endogenous Information Quality: A Job-Assignment Application,” with Yongsheng Xu, *Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie* **65** (1997), 163–180.
- “Coalition-Proof Information Exchanges,” with Shunichi O. Tsutsui, *Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie* **63** (1996), 259–278.
- “Duopoly Information Exchange: the case of unknown slope,” with Shunichi O. Tsutsui, *International Journal of Industrial Organization* **14** (1996), 119–136.
- “Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price Discrimination,” with Marius Schwartz, *Journal of International Economics* **37** (1994), 167–195.
- “Monopoly Output and Welfare: The Role of Curvature of the Demand Function,” *Journal of Economic Education* **25** (1994), 235–250.
- “Bounding the Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination,” *American Economic Review* **83** (1993), 1011–1021.
- “Collusive Behavior and Partial Ownership of Rivals,” *International Journal of Industrial Organization* **10** (1992), 27–34.

“Preemptive Investment, Toehold Entry, and the Mimicking Principle,” with Marius Schwartz, *Rand Journal of Economics* **22** (1991), 1–13.

“Monopoly Production of Durable Exhaustible Resources,” with John L. Solow, *Economica* **57** (1990), 29–47.

“Welfare Consequences of Emission Credit Trading,” *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* **18** (1990), 66–77, reprinted in *Theory and Practice of Command and Control in Environmental Policy*, Gloria E. Helfand and Peter Berck, eds., the International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2003.

“A Note on Welfare in the Durable-Goods Monopoly,” with John L. Solow, *Economica* **56** (1989), 523–527.

“Emission Credit Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New Pollution Abatement Technology,” *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* **16** (1989), 52–57.

“Exhaustibility and the Durable Goods Monopolist,” with John L. Solow, *Mathematical and Computer Modeling* **10** (1988), 419–427.

“Erratum” (to “The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs” by Charles Kahn), with John L. Solow and Charles Kahn, *Econometrica* **56** (1988), 754.

“Repeated Insurance Contracts with Differential Learning,” *Review of Economic Studies* **60** (1988), 177–181.

“On Requiring the Durable Goods Monopolist to Sell,” with John L. Solow, *Economics Letters* **25** (1987), 283–288.

“Efficient Outcomes in a Repeated Agency Model without Discounting,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics* **15** (1986), 217–230.

“The Theory of Search for Several Goods,” with Kenneth Burdett, *Journal of Economic Theory* **24** (1981), 362–376.

RECENT SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES

January 18, 2008, UCR Economic Theory Seminar, Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good

March 1–2, 2008, Southwest Economic Theory Conference, Santa Barbara, Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good

May 2, 2008, University of Colorado, Boulder, Optimal Provision of a Discrete Public Good

June 20–22, 2008, North American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Pittsburgh, Optimal Provision of a Discrete Public Good

March 13, 2009, UCR Economic Theory Seminar, Threshold Uncertainty in the Private-Information Subscription Game

July 7–10, 2009, Australasian Meeting of the Econometric Society, Canberra, Australia, Threshold Uncertainty in the Private-Information Subscription Game

August 3–6, 2009, Athens Institute for Education and Research, 4th International Symposium on Economic Theory, Policy and Applications, Athens, Greece, Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments

March 1, 2010, UCR Economic Theory Seminar, Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice

April 19, 2010, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice

June 25–27, 2010, Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice, PET10, 11th Annual Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory, Istanbul, Turkey

August 17–21, 2010, Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice, Econometric Society World Congress 2010, Shanghai, China

April 20, 2011, Tulane University, Voluntary Provision of Public Goods with Private Information and the “Weakest Link” Aggregator Function

June 6–4, 2011, Voluntary Provision of Public Goods with Private Information and the “Weakest Link” Aggregator Function, 12th Annual Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory, Bloomington, Indiana

July 11–12, 2011, member of the Organizing Committee, member of the Scientific Committee, 8th Game Theory Practice Meeting, 2011, Dedicated to Global and International Issues, Riverside, California

December 2, 2011, University of Oregon, Securing security when terrorists attack the “weakest link”

June 12–14, 2012, Group Efforts when Performance Is Determined by the “Best Shot,” 13th Annual Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory, Taipei, Taiwan

July 3–6, 2012, Group Efforts when Performance Is Determined by the “Best Shot,” Australasian Meeting of the Econometric Society, Melbourne, Australia

August 14–15, 2012, Securing Security: When Terrorists Attack the “Weakest Link,” Terrorism and Policy Conference, University of Texas-Dallas, Dallas

October 27–28, 2012, Group Efforts when Performance Is Determined by the “Best Shot,” RCGEB 2012 Fall Workshop: Topics in Game Theory and Applications, Shandong University, Jinan, China

June 14, 2013, Best-Shot Group Contests with Complete Information, GREThA Research Seminar, University Montesquieu–Bordeaux IV, Bordeaux, France.

October 4, 2013, Best-Shot Group Contests with Complete Information, UCR Department of Economics

October 11, 2013, Best-Shot Group Contests with Complete Information, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

October 25, 2013, Best-Shot Group Contests with Complete Information, University of Alberta, Alberta School of Business

November 18, 2013, Best-Shot Group Contests with Complete Information, University of Southern California

May 15, 2014, On the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods with Private Information: the case of “weakest-link” public goods, GREThA, University Montesquieu–Bordeaux IV, Bordeaux, France

July 11–14, 2014, Private-Information Best-Shot Group Contests, 14th Annual Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory, Seattle, Washington

October 31, 2014, Private-Information Group Contests, University of Cincinnati

November 7, 2014, Private-Information Group Contests, Tulane University

July 1–4, 2015, Limited Information-Sharing Alliances in Contests, Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory, Luxembourg

July 25–26, 2015, Limited Information-Sharing Alliances in Contests, conference entitled Contests: Theory and Evidence, sponsored by the Center for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences at East Anglia University, Norwich, England

July 27–31, 2015, Private-Information Group Contests, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Cambridge University, Cambridge, England

August 17–21, 2015, Private-Information Group Contests, 11th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Montréal, Canada

October 21, 2015, Limited Information-Sharing Alliances in Contests, University of California, Merced

November 21–23, 2015, Limited Information-Sharing Alliances in Contests, Southern Economic Association Meeting, New Orleans

WORKING PAPERS AND WORK IN PROGRESS

“Private-Information Group Contests,” with Stefano Barbieri, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2501771>.

“Limited-Membership Information-Sharing Alliances in Contests,” with Huiling Zhang

“Information-Sharing Alliances in a First-Price Auction,” with Huiling Zhang

“On the Voluntary Provision of 'Weakest-Link' Public Goods: the case of private information,”
with Stefano Barbieri

GRADUATE STUDENTS (PH.D., dates completed)

Chair or Co-chair

Steven Levkoff, 7/2011

Jie Wei, 6/2014

Huiling Zhang, 8/2015

Committee Member

Maithili Ramachandran, 8/2011

Xie Chen (Tulane University), 5/2013

Zhiming Fu, 5/2014

Dongpeng Liu, 5/2014

Wen Kong, 6/2015

RECENT REFEREEING: *American Economic Review, Canadian Journal of Economics, Econometrica, Economic Journal, Economic Theory, Economic Inquiry, Economics and Politics, Environmental and Resource Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Political Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Public Economics, Rand Journal of Economics, Resource and Energy Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Review of Industrial Organization, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Singapore Economic Review, Southern Economic Journal, Theoretical Economics, Theory and Decision*

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS: American Economic Association, Econometric Society, Southern Economic Association